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Abstract
This study presents evidence of heterogeneous returns to education over the wage
distribution. The authors use instrumental variable quantile regression and data
from the Swiss Labor Force Survey to identify the causal link between education
and wages at different quantiles of the conditional distribution of wages. The results
provide evidence that there is no unique causal effect of schooling and that for each
individual the effect may deviate from those extensively documented by ordinary
least squares or two-stage least squares. In particular, while ordinary quantile
regression estimates increasing returns in the quantile index, once the endogeneity
of schooling is taken into account the authors instead observe higher returns at lower
quantiles of the wage distribution. Interpreting the quantile index as a measure of
unobserved ability, the results suggest that higher-ability individuals have higher
wages, but the slope of their wage-education profile is flatter than that for lower-
ability individuals.
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1 Introduction
Although a positive relationship clearly exists between schooling and wages (Dickson
and Harmon, 2011), the question of whether education affects individuals differently over
the wage distribution is much less analyzed (Wang, 2013). Moreover, in a distributional
setting, the literature has not investigated whether different types of education result in
differing returns, or whether one type of education—vocational or academic—brings a
return premium compared to the other at some point of the wage distribution. These
questions are particularly important because a lack of information about educational
tracks may lead to costly decisions for both the individual and the government (Bettinger
and Baker, 2011).
To fill these gaps, in this study we first causally estimate the returns to education over
the wage distribution. The analysis reveals potential heterogeneous effects of education
on wages, answering the question of whether the returns are increasing, decreasing, or
u-shaped across the quantiles. In a second step, we compare the returns to one extra
year of academic education with the returns to one extra year of vocational education,
to investigate whether one track brings a return premium at any point in the wage
distribution. Such a comparison is lacking in the literature, generally because most
countries do not have an extensive vocational education and training system that allows
acquiring the same quality of education and the same number of years as in the academic
track, or because the academic track is more prestigious or preferred than the vocational
one.1
One notable exception is Switzerland,2 a country with an extensive vocational ed-
ucation system that attracts two-thirds of the individuals in every cohort (Tuor and
Backes-Gellner, 2010). The Swiss educational system allows students to achieve tertiary
education degrees for both academic and vocational tracks. Therefore, using Swiss data
1See, e.g., Bettinger, Kremer, and Saavedra (2010) for Colombia.
2Other countries with similar vocational systems are Denmark and Germany (Hanushek, Woessmann,
and Zhang, 2011).
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allows us to shed light on heterogeneous returns to different types of education, and
to answer the question of how academic and vocational education differ over the wage
distribution.
The analyses that we propose address two major issues that are common for estima-
tions of returns to education: endogeneity of education attainment (Harmon, Oosterbeek,
and Walker, 2003) and heterogeneity in the returns to education (Henderson, Polachek,
and Wang, 2011). While theoretical research considers both issues simultaneously (Arias,
Hallock, and Sosa-Escudero, 2001; Card, 1999), empirical work often deals with only one
issue at a time. To overcome the endogeneity problem, most scholars use instrumen-
tal variable estimation (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Dickson, 2013; Harmon and Walker,
2000; Trostel, Walker, and Woolley, 2002).
However, when dealing with the heterogeneity issue, the literature has not con-
verged to a standard method for integrating it into the analysis (Lemieux, 2008). There-
fore, researchers usually rely on different methods when accounting for heterogeneity
in returns to education: Sub-sample analysis (Harmon, Oosterbeek, and Walker, 2003),
non-parametric estimation (Henderson, Polachek, and Wang, 2011), Bayesian hierarchi-
cal models (Koop and Tobias, 2004), and quantile regression (Fasih, Kingdon, Patrinos,
Sakellariou, and Soderbom, 2012; Martins and Pereira, 2004). The first three methods
focus mainly on the existence and the nature of heterogeneity, which are not the focus
of this study. However, quantile regression (QR) is instead more appropriate to our
research question, because QR estimates the returns to education over the wage distribu-
tion, allowing for heterogeneity through quantile-specific intercepts and quantile-specific
slopes.
The use of QR in returns to education studies was hindered for many years because
the endogeneity problem in QR models could not be solved. However, recent studies by
Chernozhukov and Hansen (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2008, 2013) propose an instru-
mental variable quantile regression (IVQR) approach that deals with both heterogeneity
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and endogeneity at the same time. Although the IVQR method has been applied in many
research fields in economics (Atella, Pace, and Vuri, 2008; Autor, Houseman, and Kerr,
2012; Eren, 2009; Lamarche, 2011; Maynard and Qiu, 2009; Wehby, Murray, Castilla,
Lopez-Camelo, and Ohsfeldt, 2009), it is relatively new to the returns to education liter-
ature. Only two studies implement IVQR to propose alternative instruments for schooling
(Arabsheibani and Staneva, 2012) and to examine the inequality-reducing effect of edu-
cation in China (Wang, 2013).
Exploiting a major education reform that took place in Switzerland in the 1970s, we
use IVQR to causally estimate the returns to education over the wage distribution, and
we compare the results with standard QR and ordinary least squares (OLS) to determine
whether taking endogeneity into account changes results and conclusions. In a second
step, we also distinguish between educational paths, to add a new comparison between
and within academic and vocational education. In this latter comparison we are especially
interested in the presence of heterogeneity, and we therefore use only conventional QR
methods.3
The results provide evidence that there is no unique causal effect of schooling and that
for each individual the effect may deviate from those extensively documented by ordinary
least squares or two-stage least squares. In particular, while ordinary quantile regression
estimates increasing returns in the quantile index, once the endogeneity of schooling is
taken into account the authors instead observe higher returns at lower quantiles of the
wage distribution. We also reveal significant heterogeneity within the academic and the
vocational track, and comparing these two paths shows that academic education does
not always yield higher returns. In the upper half of the wage distribution, individuals
with an academic background have higher returns than individuals with a vocational
background. However, at lower quantiles of the wage distribution, vocational education
brings higher returns than academic education, suggesting that answering the question
3Nevertheless, we also performed instrumental variable (quantile) regressions, which are available
upon request.
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of which type of education has larger returns is not as easy as it might appear from
descriptive statistics or mean regression.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
theoretical background related to our research questions. Section 3 introduces the data
set and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 shows the econometric models in
detail. Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
2 Background
In this section, we briefly present some theoretical background and empirical evidence
to explain the underlying mechanisms in the individual education choice and provide a
structure for our empirical analysis. We follow the theoretical model developed by Card
(1999); its most interesting feature is that it considers both heterogeneity in the returns
and endogeneity of education attainment in the wage equation at the same time.
Following Card, we assume that an individual chooses his level of education to max-
imize the following utility function defined over wage and years of education:
U(w, S) = ln(w)− f(S) = ln[g(S)]− f(S) (1)
where g(S) and f(S) are increasing convex functions that represent the benefits and costs
of schooling, respectively. The condition w = g(S) captures the observable relationship
of wage to schooling, i.e., the level of wages available at each level of education. The first
order condition for optimal education is:
g′(S)
g(S)
= f ′(S) (2)
In the optimum, the marginal rate of return to education equals the marginal cost. Indi-
vidual heterogeneity in the optimal education choice arises from two sources: differences
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in the cost of education, represented by the variation in f(S), and differences in the
monetary benefit of education, represented by the variation in g′(S)/g(S).
To characterize the well-documented fact that (log)wage is a nearly linear function
of schooling that may vary across individuals,4 we impose the following functional form
to the heterogeneity components:
MBi =
g′(S)
g(S)
= bi − k1 · Si (3)
MCi = f
′(S) = ri + k2 · Si (4)
where bi and ri are random variables with some joint distribution across the population
i = 1, 2, .. and k1 and k2 are non-negative constants. To derive an equation for the
natural logarithm of wage, we integrate the expression for the marginal rate of return to
education with respect to Si:
ln(wi) = ai + bi · Si − 1
2
· k1 · S2i (5)
where ai is an individual-specific constant of integration.
Equation (5) is a general version of the functional form adopted in Mincer (1974).
However, the salient feature of Card’s model is that individual heterogeneity potentially
affects both the intercept of the wage equation (through ai) and the slope of the wage-
education relation (through bi).
This latter feature introduces three important issues into the empirical work. First,
we should expect different returns to education for individuals with different levels of abil-
ity. More specifically, given that individuals acquire education up to the point where the
marginal cost equals the marginal rate of return, and given that costs depend negatively
4Card and Krueger (1992), Heckman and Polachek (1974), and Hungerford and Solon (1987) present
evidence suggesting that wages are nearly log-linear with respect to schooling. Furthermore, Park (1994)
finds log-linearity to be a good approximation of the wage-schooling relationship not only at the mean
but also for several quantiles of the wage distribution.
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on ability, we should observe that returns to education decrease as ability increases. This
means that, while higher-ability individuals have on average higher wages, the slope of
their wage-education profile is flatter than that for lower-ability individuals. Second, we
cannot assess the true impact of education on wages without solving the bias introduced
by the endogeneity of schooling attainment, because otherwise cross-sectional estimates
are (marginally) upward biased by an omitted ability variable (Heckman, Lochner, and
Todd, 2006). Third, if we want to study how education affects different individuals, we
need to account simultaneously for heterogeneity and endogeneity.
To incorporate these features into our analysis, we use IVQR, which estimates the
causal effect of education on conditional quantiles of the wage distribution, allowing for
quantile-specific intercepts and quantile-specific slopes. Given that IVQR is a relatively
new method, the vast majority of the literature uses conventional QR to investigate the
heterogeneous effects of education on wage (Fasih, Kingdon, Patrinos, Sakellariou, and
Soderbom, 2012; Harmon, Oosterbeek, and Walker, 2003; Hartog, Pereira, and Vieira,
2001; Martins and Pereira, 2004). From these studies we conclude that returns to edu-
cation vary substantially over the wage distribution, i.e., that average effects lose some
important distributional features of the return to education. These studies also suggest
that returns to education increase in the quantiles of wage distribution. As we can in-
terpret the quantile index as a measure of ability (Arias, Hallock, and Sosa-Escudero,
2001; Mwabu and Schultz, 1996), this finding contrasts with what we would theoreti-
cally expect. However, the implicit assumption of exogenous schooling in conventional
QR studies may explain the discrepancy between theoretical expectation and empirical
findings.
The few studies applying IVQR in the return-to-education context present mixed
results. Using spouse education as an instrument for education, Wang (2013) investi-
gates the evolution of the returns in China over time, to examine the inequality-reducing
effect of education. He estimates slightly decreasing returns to education over the wage
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distribution, ranging from 5.1 percent at the lowest quartile to 3.1 percent at the highest
quartile. Proposing risky sexual behavior at an early age as a new instrument for school-
ing, Arabsheibani and Staneva (2012) apply IVQR to Russian data and find increasing
returns over the wage distribution. Specifically, they estimate a 5 percent return at the
lowest decile and a 15 percent return at the highest decile. However, when estimating the
causal return to education both approaches rely on a demand-side variation in schooling,
making defending the orthogonality between the instruments and the error term of the
wage equation very difficult (Arcand, D’Hombres, and Gyselinck, 2005).
Pushing the analysis further, researchers and policymakers are often interested in
the return to different educational paths, such as academic and vocational education.
While most studies on returns to education do not consider the curriculum content of the
variable years of education, policymakers—as well as students and parents—may need
more information than simply the average return to a year of education, especially when
they have to make decisions about different types of educational investments. In this
context, a typical question is whether vocational education yields a lower or higher labor
market return than an academic education of the same number of years.
Generally, the literature suggests that academic degrees have larger benefits than
vocational degrees. Dearden, McIntosh, Myck, and Vignoles (2002) provide evidence on
the relative value of academic and vocational qualifications in the British labor market.
Their results show that the wage premium associated with academic qualifications is on
average higher than that associated with vocational qualifications at the same level. Sim-
ilarly, Saniter (2012) examines the returns to education for different educational groups
in Germany. He finds that the return to education is 8.5 percent for the entire sample,
2.3 percent for graduates from the basic school track (vocationally oriented), and 11 per-
cent for graduates from a higher school track (academically oriented). Focusing on non-
monetary benefits of educational tracks, Hanushek, Woessmann, and Zhang (2011) find
that gains in youth employment from vocational education are offset by less adaptability
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and consequent diminished employment later in life. Thus, over the life-cycle, academic
education appears to have larger non-monetary benefits than vocational education.
However, none of these studies analyze the return to one extra year of academic
education with the return to one extra year of vocational education to investigate whether
one track brings a return premium, nor do they explore the possibility of heterogeneous
effects between and within educational paths. Instead, they focus on qualifications and
non-monetary benefits, probably because many countries do not have an education system
that allows acquiring tertiary degrees in either the academic or the vocational track. In
those countries, therefore, years of education are typically very different in the two tracks.
As the case in Switzerland is the opposite, we complement the discussion on academic
versus vocational track by revealing the heterogeneous effects of the two educational paths
and by analyzing whether—and at which point of the wage distribution—one track has
higher returns than the other.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Before introducing the data and providing descriptive statistics, we briefly present the
current Swiss education system. The education system in Switzerland consists of parallel
paths divided into vocational and academic education. After nine years of compulsory
schooling, about two-thirds of a youth cohort choose to pursue vocational education and
training, mostly within what is called “dual system” of apprenticeship training. This kind
of training generally comprises a curriculum-based on-the-job training component and a
theoretical component taught at specialized vocational schools. After graduation, most of
these apprentices work as skilled workers within their occupational fields. Alternatively,
vocational graduates have several other options for continuing their education. They may
choose to go into higher vocational education and acquire a higher vocational education
degree or a university of applied sciences degree. Another post-compulsory possibility for
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students is to remain in the academic school system, attend academic secondary school
and obtain a “Matura”, a high school diploma that is a prerequisite for tertiary academic
education. At tertiary academic institutions such as universities and federal institutes of
technology, students can acquire degrees ranging from a bachelor’s degree to a doctorate.
We base our analysis on data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS), produced
annually by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. The data are collected by telephone
interviews, and the sample is representative for the adult population permanently living
in Switzerland. The main purpose of the SLFS is to provide information on employment
behavior patterns and on the structure of the labor force. Strict adherence to international
definitions makes Swiss data comparable with OECD, European, and U.S. data. The
SLFS was conducted for the first time in 1991 and is based on a sample of about 105,000
interviews. We select the period 2000-2009, and we pool these cross-sections to build our
sample.5
To avoid special circumstances such as those that might arise from retirement, our
sample takes into account only males aged 18-60. We also restrict the sample to employed
individuals to avoid misspecification resulting from people being in school or not being
active in the labor force. Among the employed, to retain individuals with attachment to
the labor market, we focus on fully employed workers.6 The wage variable of the SLFS
comes from the Swiss Survey on Income and Living Conditions, a very precise data source
for income resulting from labor activity. Among those individuals with no missing wage,
we excluded 0.5 percent of each tail end of the wage distribution to attenuate the impact
of outliers and remove implausible values. Wages are expressed in Swiss Francs (CHF)
throughout the entire paper, deflated to the year 2010.7
In the SLFS, for each individual, we can observe the entire education path from
5The SLFS is a rotating panel. We keep one observation per individual to prevent problems of
nonrandom attrition and clustering.
6We use the official definition of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, which considers an individual as
fully employed if he or she has an employment of at least 90 percent.
7In 2010, 1 CHF = 1 USD. In Switzerland, inflation is very low and stable.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Annual wage 81,868 41,824 12,816 390,292
Age 40.23 10.09 18.00 60.00
Years of education 13.16 2.88 7.00 21.00
Years of vocational 2.82 2.34 0.00 9.00
Years of academic 1.80 3.56 0.00 12.50
Compulsory education 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Vocational education 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
Academic education 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
N 34,744
Notes: Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
compulsory education to doctorate, and we dichotomize the educational paths into aca-
demic and vocational according to the official definition of the Swiss State Secretariat for
Education and Research (appendix figure A.1). After removing individuals with miss-
ing values, we are left with 34,744 observations in the sample. Tables 1 and 2 provide
descriptive statistics.8
From the descriptive analysis on the full sample (table 1), we observe that the average
worker earns an annual wage of CHF 81,868 and has acquired 13.16 years of education.
In line with the statistics at the national level, in our sample 65 percent of the individuals
followed a vocational path, whereas 23 percent obtained an academic degree (Tuor and
Backes-Gellner, 2010). The rest of the sample (12 percent) has compulsory education
as the highest educational level. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics over wage distri-
bution, which shows the well-known positive relationship between education and wage.
However, these figures do not take into account unobserved heterogeneity; in particular,
differences in ability are not factored in. Therefore, descriptive results give no indication
of the causal wage effects of different types of education.
8See appendix Table B.1 for the details on sample construction.
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4 Methods
In this section, we first introduce the equations to be estimated. We use two different
models: one to analyze the return to education and one to compare the academic track
with the vocational track. Second, we briefly describe the estimation methods we apply,
i.e., OLS, QR, and instrumental variable estimations. Given that QR and IVQR are
not as common as OLS and two-stage least squares (TSLS), we give a brief overview of
these two methods following Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Chernozhukov and Hansen
(2013). Third, we describe and discuss the instrumental variables we use for the causal
estimation of the returns to education.
4.1 The Wage Equations
To estimate the private monetary return to one additional year of education, we consider
the following Mincer-like equation:
ln(wi) = δ0 + βS · Si + δ1 · Agei + δ2 · Age2i + ϕt + ui (6)
In equation (6), wi is the annual wage of individual i, Si represents the years of education,
Agei is a proxy for labor market experience, ϕt is a set of time controls, and ui is an error
term. As is common in the literature, we exclude various determinants of wages such
as tenure and industry sector, because such variables are potentially endogenous and
determined by education itself (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In model (6), the coefficient
of interest is the one on the variable years of schooling βS, which we expect to be positive
and significant.
To compare the effect of one additional year of academic education to the effect of
one additional year of vocational education, we develop a model similar to that used
by Hartog, Pereira, and Vieira (2001) and Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006).
Hartog et al. modify the classical Mincer wage equation and include a spline in year
12
of education for three categories of the school system: primary, secondary, and tertiary
education. With this specification, they investigate the different effects of education on
wages among different levels of education. With a similar specification, Vandenbussche
et al. study the effect of tertiary education on the growth rate of countries. They sepa-
rate the effect of tertiary education from primary and secondary education to show that
skilled labor has a higher growth-enhancing effect for countries closer to the technological
frontier. In our case, we decompose the education variable as defined in model (6) into its
three components: compulsory education (C), vocational education (V ), and academic
education (A). Thus, we can rewrite equation (6) as follows:
ln(wi) = δ0 + βC · Ci + βV · Vi + βA · Ai + δ1 · Agei + δ2 · Age2i + ϕt + ui (7)
In model (7), the parameters of interest are βV and βA. With this second specification,
we compare the return premium of one additional year of vocational education with the
premium of one additional year of academic education.9 While expecting both parameters
to be significant and positive is reasonable, building expectations about the comparison
between the two is not straightforward, for the following two reasons. First, previous
literature on the topic is scarce. Existing studies either compare higher tracks with lower
tracks (Saniter, 2012) or focus on non-monetary returns (Hanushek, Woessmann, and
Zhang, 2011) and returns to qualifications (Dearden, McIntosh, Myck, and Vignoles,
2002). Second, inserting this topic into a distributional framework creates an additional
challenge, because—as in the case of returns to education in general—the returns to the
vocational (academic) path may be heterogeneous over the wage distribution.
9To test whether the two coefficients are different, we perform an F -test, whose null hypothesis is:
βˆV − βˆA = 0.
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4.2 Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression
The vast majority of applied econometrics focuses on averages, and such focus partly re-
flects the difficulty of producing credible average causal effects. As long as the dependent
variable is binary, the mean describes the entire distribution. However, many variables
such as earnings have continuous distributions, which can change in response to treat-
ments in ways that averages do not fully reveal. QR provides a straightforward, powerful
tool for modeling distributional effects, even if the underlying mechanism is complex and
multidimensional (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
To allow for heterogeneous effects of education on wages, we consider the τ th condi-
tional quantile wage function hereafter (we drop the indexes for clarity):
Qln(w)[τ |X,S] = X ′α(τ) + β(τ)S (8)
where X denotes all explanatory variables other than education (1, Agei, Age
2
i , ϕt), α(τ)
is the return to X at the τ th quantile, β(τ) is the return to education at the τ th quantile,
and τ ∈ (0, 1) 7→ X ′α(τ)+β(τ)S is strictly increasing in τ . In equation (8) the returns to
education are a function of τ , allowing for heterogeneous effects of education on wages.
Assuming the error term in the wage equation to be independent ofX and S, Koenker
and Bassett (1978) propose finding the best predictor of log-wage given X and S under
the asymmetric least absolute deviation loss. Doing so means estimating α(τ) and β(τ)
in equation (8) by solving the following minimization problem:
Qln(w)[τ |X,S] = arg min
α(τ),β(τ)
E[ρτ (ln(w)−X ′α(τ)− β(τ)S)] (9)
where ρτ (ui) is the“check function” defined as ρτ (ui) = [τ −1(ui ≤ 0)]ui. In practice, the
minimization problem is solved via linear programming and implemented in many statis-
tical packages. As previously discussed, assuming independence between the education
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variable and the error term may be too stringent because of potential unobserved wage
determinants (i.e., ability bias). To account for potential dependence between S and u
in a distributional framework, we apply the IVQR method developed by Chernozhukov
and Hansen (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2006, 2008, 2013).
As in the case of TSLS, the identification of the IVQR approach relies on the existence
of a vector Z of instrumental variables that are statistically related to S but independent
of the error term u. Additionally, we have to assume that, given the information (X,S),
the distribution of the structural error does not vary across the endogenous state S (“rank
similarity”).10 The structural error is responsible for heterogeneity of potential outcomes
among individuals with the same observed characteristics. This error term determines the
relative ranking of observationally equivalent individuals in the distribution of potential
outcomes conditional on the individual’s observed characteristics. Rank similarity differs
from exact rank invariance by allowing deviations in the individual rank away from some
common level. In such formulation, we assume that an individual selects an education
level without knowing the exact potential outcomes. Unfortunately, we cannot test rank
similarity, but this assumption is consistent with many empirical situations where the
exact latent outcomes are not known before a certain treatment.
Chernozhukov and Hansen show that assuming rank similarity implies the following
moment condition:
P[ln(w) ≤ Qln(w)(τ |X,S)|X,Z] = τ (10)
and thus, in our case:
P[ln(w)−X ′α(τ)− β(τ)S ≤ 0|X,Z] = τ (11)
The moment condition given in (11) provides a statistical restriction for use in estimating
the parameters α(τ) and β(τ). Pointing out that equation (11) is equivalent to the state-
10u|X,Z ∼ U(0, 1), i.e., for each S and S′ given (X,S): US ∼ US′ .
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ment that zero is the τ th quantile of the random variable ln(w)−Qln(w)(τ |X,S) conditional
on (X,Z), Chernozhukov and Hansen formulate the problem as finding [α(τ), β(τ)] so
that zero is the solution to the standard quantile regression of [ln(w)−X ′α(τ)− β(τ)S]
on (X,Z):
0 = arg min
f∈F
E[ρτ (ln(w)−X ′α(τ)− β(τ)S − f(X,Z))] (12)
where F is the class of measurable functions of (X,Z). In our empirical application,
we restrict F to the values of Zi, i.e., f(X,Z) = Z
′γˆ. To obtain an estimate for β(τ),
we look for a value βˆ that makes the estimated coefficient on the instrumental variable
γˆ(β, τ) in equation (12) as close to zero as possible using a series of conventional quantile
regression.
In practice, the IVQR estimator consists of a two-step procedure: For a given value of
βj(τ), we first run the ordinary QR of ln(w)−βj(τ)S on X and Z to obtain the estimates
[αˆ(βj(τ), τ), γˆ(βj(τ), τ)]. Second, we test γˆ(βj(τ), τ) = 0 and save the corresponding F -
statistic, Fj. We then repeat these two steps for all the values in a pre-specified support
for βj(τ) and the value that minimizes the F -statistic is the IVQR estimator βˆ(τ)IV QR.
Once we have βˆ(τ)IV QR, we retrieve the correspondent αˆ(τ).11
The IVQR approach allows for an interpretation of the βˆ(τ)IV QR as actual effects
on individuals having fixed their level of unobserved heterogeneity at a given quantile.
Therefore, the effect is not identified only for the set of individuals whose treatment is
altered by switching the instrument from zero to one, as in the case of the IV quantile
treatment estimator proposed by Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002). Furthermore, the
IVQR method puts no restriction of the form of the endogenous variables and instruments
(i.e., they can be binary, discrete, or continuous).
11To obtain the point estimates and standard errors, we use both the Stata command ivqreg and the
Matlab function invqr, with almost no difference between the two approaches. The codes are publicly
available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/christian.hansen/research/
16
4.3 Identification Strategy
Given the widely acknowledged endogeneity of educational attainment in the wage equa-
tion, finding valid instruments to control for this phenomenon is crucial. However, choos-
ing suitable instruments remains a topic of great debate in the literature on returns to
education (Arcand, D’Hombres, and Gyselinck, 2005; Dickson, 2013; Heckman, Lochner,
and Todd, 2006). In general, an ideal instrument should be correlated with educational
attainment but uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants of the wage.
The literature on returns to education used several instruments for education: quar-
ter of birth (Angrist and Krueger, 1991), early smoking habits (Evans and Montgomery,
1994), presence or sex of siblings (Butcher and Case, 1994), college proximity (Card,
1994), parental education (Harmon and Walker, 2000), and spouse education (Trostel,
Walker, and Woolley, 2002). Over the past decade, the literature has been investigating
educational reforms as a source of exogenous variation in educational attainment.12 In
particular, changes in school-leaving age (Dickson, 2013; Harmon and Walker, 1999) and
compulsory education expansions (Brunello, Fort, and Weber, 2009; Brunello, Fabbri,
and Fort, 2013; Fang, Eggleston, Rizzo, Rozelle, and Zeckhauser, 2012) have been at-
tracting research interest. Following this last strand of the literature, we exploit a major
reform in the Swiss educational system to build our instruments and estimate the true
(causal) effect of education on wages.
In Switzerland, the main responsibility for education and culture lies with the can-
tons, which loosely coordinate their work at the federal level. The 26 cantonal ministers
of education together form a political body named the Swiss Conference of Cantonal
Ministers of Education (EDK). The EDK is responsible for educational reforms, policies,
and coordination at the national level. In 1970, the EDK produced an important educa-
tional reform, with the aim of standardizing certain aspects of the Swiss education from
12For a recent study on the impact of educational reforms on educational attainment, see Braga,
Checchi, and Meschi (2013).
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compulsory school through high school. This reform became official on October 29, 1970.
Previously, cantons had different compulsory school duration (seven, eight, or nine years)
and different school year start (either spring or fall).
The reform set nine years of compulsory education for all cantons, and mandated
that the school-year start in the fall. Given that some cantons were already in line with
this reform, only about half had to change their education system. Moreover, cantons
did not introduce the reforms immediately after 1970. They had time to adapt their
education systems in the years following the agreement, with continuous feedback to
the EDK on the reform status. Thus, we are able to keep track of the introduction of
the reform in each canton. Additionally, to double-check the cantonal reform status, we
also contacted each canton’s educational ministry. Appendix tables C.1 and C.2 give an
overview of the reforms for each canton, the dates of their introduction in the canton (or
not), and the ways in which the reforms modified (or not) the canton’s education system.
We use the compulsory education expansion as an instrument for years of education.
The empirical literature suggests that postponing the allocation of pupils to tracks yields
positive effects on average educational attainment, because students stay in school longer
and drop out less (Braga, Checchi, and Meschi, 2013). Similar to Brunello, Fort, and
Weber (2009); Brunello, Fabbri, and Fort (2013); Fang, Eggleston, Rizzo, Rozelle, and
Zeckhauser (2012), we exploit the series of natural experiments created by the staggered
implementation of Switzerland’s education reform as an instrument for estimating each
individual’s completed years of schooling. This approach obviates the problem of endo-
geneity due to unobservable variables that are correlated with both education and wage.
Compulsory schooling instrument might not work properly for individuals at the top of
the distribution, because such high wage (ability) workers may be willing to acquire more
schooling independent of the education expansion. The IVQR method does not allow to
compute a first stage, but we can study the reduced-form effect to find out in which parts
of the wage distribution we have identification from our instrument.
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Given that the effective date of the shift in school-year start also constitutes a (small)
exogenous change in years of education, we might be willing to use this change as a second
instrument for years of education completed. Pischke (2007) uses a similar approach for
Germany, where a cohort experienced a shorter school year. In our case, however, the
reform pertained all school levels from compulsory to high school, expanding the pool of
“compliers.” Furthermore, the individuals affected by this second reform where different
from the ones affected by the compulsory schooling expansion (different cantons and/or
different year of introduction). Appendix tables D.1 and D.2 present TSLS and IVQR
estimates for a series of over-identified models using both instruments. However, we
base our main analysis on the compulsory education expansion reform, because it is
an instrument already known to the literature and because the results are qualitatively
similar to the over-identified cases.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Causal Returns to Education Over Wage Distribution
Table 3 shows the regression outputs for model (6), which focuses on the returns to educa-
tion. Mean regression (column 1, table 3) estimates a return to education of 6.7 percent,
which indicates that wages rise by almost seven percent on average with each extra year
of education. The effect is highly significant and not far from the few previous studies on
returns to education in Switzerland, which estimate returns of about 7-8 percent (Weber
and Wolter, 1999).
When we allow for heterogeneous effects of education on wage, an interesting picture
emerges. QR estimates (columns 2-6, table 3) show that returns to education increase
over the quantiles of the wage distribution. The return to education is 3.9 percent at the
bottom decile, increasing to 6.9 percent at the median (τ = 0.5), and reaching 8.9 percent
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Table 3: Returns to Education, OLS and QR Estimates
Variables OLS 1st Decile 3rd Decile Median 7th Decile 9th Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of education 0.067** 0.039** 0.060** 0.069** 0.076** 0.089**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.053** 0.037** 0.042** 0.048** 0.054** 0.067**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age2/100 -0.051** -0.039** -0.042** -0.046** -0.051** -0.064**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 9.118** 9.474** 9.287** 9.163** 9.056** 8.801**
(0.029) (0.050) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.050)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
(Pseudo) R2 0.292 0.060 0.149 0.206 0.239 0.232
N 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
at the top decile of the wage distribution. These results underline that average effects
may hide useful information about the rest of the distribution: Further emphasizing the
heterogeneous effects of education on wage, Figure 1 reports the quantile-specific returns
to education from τ = 0.1 to τ = 0.9. Our estimated returns pattern over the wage
distribution is very similar to those found by the literature for other countries (Fasih,
Kingdon, Patrinos, Sakellariou, and Soderbom, 2012; Harmon, Oosterbeek, and Walker,
2003; Hartog, Pereira, and Vieira, 2001).
Table 4 presents TSLS estimates of model (6). As an instrument for years of edu-
cation we use the expansion in compulsory education that took place in some cantons
after 1970. The returns to education estimated by TSLS are slightly higher than OLS
estimates, with a point estimate (standard error) of 9.9 percent (0.019). This result is
typical in the literature on returns to education and is usually motivated by measurement
error in the education variables (Card, 2001) and local average treatment effects (Imbens
and Angrist, 1994; Imbens, 2010).
The coefficient on the instrumental variable in both the reduced form and first stage
has the expected sign and is highly significant. In the first stage model (column 3 of
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Figure 1: Returns to Education, QR Estimates
table 4), our instrument has a positive and significant effect on years of education. This
finding is in line with the expectations discussed in section 4.3, and is consistent with
studies that use similar instruments (Braga, Checchi, and Meschi, 2013; Brunello, Fort,
and Weber, 2009; Brunello, Fabbri, and Fort, 2013; Fang, Eggleston, Rizzo, Rozelle, and
Zeckhauser, 2012). In our specific case, the reforms increased educational attainment by
one third of a year on average, whereas previous studies estimated an effect of about
half a year. The test for excluded instruments has an F -statistic of 40.75, which is well
beyond the accepted standard of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997). We are therefore confident
about the strength of the instrumental variable. We also reject the null hypotheses of
under-identification for our instrument (Kleibergen-Paap statistic).
Table 5 shows the IVQR estimates of model (6). With this regression analysis we
causally estimate the impact of education on wage at a given quantile of the wage distri-
bution. Similar to QR estimates, IVQR results also suggest that the returns to schooling
vary substantially over the wage distribution. This heterogeneity is most apparent in the
IVQR estimates. While both QR and IVQR approaches indicate that returns to education
are heterogeneous, the shapes of the estimated returns over the quantiles are different.
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Table 4: Returns to Education, TSLS Estimates
Variables OLS Reduced Form First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of education 0.067** 0.099**
(0.001) (0.019)
Age 0.053** 0.065** 0.174** 0.048**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003)
Age2/100 -0.051** -0.066** -0.211** -0.046**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.004)
Constant 9.118** 9.748** 10.192** 8.725**
(0.029) (0.033) (0.228) (0.214)
IV–Education expansion 0.034** 0.346**
(0.007) (0.054)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
R2 0.292 0.095 0.018 0.249
N 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744
Test for excluded instruments
F -statistic 40.75**
Under-identification test
Kleibergen-Paap LM-statistic 39.90**
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1), (2),
and (4) the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage, in column (3) the dependent
variable is years of education.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
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As in several previous studies, QR estimates exhibit increasing returns to education, in-
dicating that returns are higher at higher quantiles of the wage distribution. However,
if education is endogenous to the wage equation of model (6), conventional QR does not
consistently estimate the causal effect of education on wage. IVQR estimates are instead
(asymptotically) consistent under endogeneity and show that returns are decreasing over
the wage distribution.
Specifically, the return to education estimated by IVQR is 18.3 percent at the first
decile, decreasing to 9.6 percent at the median, and going down to an insignificant 1.6
percent at the last decile of the wage distribution. These results indicate that the largest
gains to additional years of education accrue to individuals at the low end of the wage
distribution. Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of these results from τ = 0.1
to τ = 0.9, with a quantile interval of 0.05. The reduced-form quantile IV approach
produces qualitatively similar point estimates and distributional patterns to the structural
IVQR approach, indicating that our substantive results are not sensitive to the estimation
procedure (Autor, Houseman, and Kerr, 2012). A look at the reduced-form effects might
explain the drop in returns at the top of the wage distribution. As Figure 2 indicates, for
top earners we do not have a reduced-form effect, making it impossible to compute the
respective instrumental variable estimate. Therefore, the drop in return in the top decile
is due to a loss of identification rather than a zero causal effect of one additional year
of education. This finding is consistent with our discussion of subsection 4.3, in which
we argued that our instrument would not work properly for individuals at the top of the
distribution.
The IVQR estimates are also consistent with the theoretical expectations we for-
mulated previously. As the quantile index τ can be viewed as a measure of unobserved
individual ability, the IVQR results are in line with the argument that individuals ac-
quire education up to the point where the cost equals the rate of return and where costs
depend negatively on ability (Card, 1999). In this setting, we would expect the returns
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Table 5: Returns to Education, TSLS and IVQR Estimates
Variables TSLS 1st Decile 3rd Decile Median 7th Decile 9th Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of education 0.099** 0.183** 0.169** 0.096** 0.066** 0.016
(0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.044)
Age 0.048** 0.005 0.026** 0.046** 0.055** 0.100**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Age2/100 -0.046** 0.005 -0.022** -0.045** -0.052** -0.097**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Constant 8.725** 7.781** 8.048** 8.828** 9.178** 9.166**
(0.199) (0.076) (0.055) (0.042) (0.043) (0.476)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Reduced form effect 0.034** 0.063** 0.046** 0.037** 0.035** -0.001
(0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
N 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
to education to be decreasing in ability, with the lower-ability individuals having the
highest return to education—which is exactly the pattern estimated by IVQR. More-
over, interpreting the quantile index as an ability measure is also consistent with the
notion that individuals with higher ability are likely to generate higher wages regardless
of their educational level. Conversely, individuals with lower unobserved ability would
gain more from the training provided by formal education. Our estimates suggest that
higher-ability individuals indeed have higher wages, but the slope of their wage-education
profile is flatter than that for lower-ability individuals.
Using a different instrument (shift in school-year start) and a combination of two
instruments (compulsory education expansion and shift in school-year start) does not
largely affect the estimated return (see appendix table D.1). However, with multiple
instruments we have a gain in the precision of the education coefficient and we can
test for over-identification. The p-value of the Hansen statistic is always not significant,
indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all our model assumptions are
fulfilled—including the validity of the instruments.
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Figure 2: Returns to Education, IVQR Estimates
5.2 Heterogeneous Returns Between and Within Types of Ed-
ucation
We now focus on the comparison between educational paths. Table 6 gives an overview of
the OLS and QR estimates of model (7). Column 1 of Table 6 presents OLS regressions,
which estimate a return to vocational education of 6.8 percent and a return to academic
education of 7.1 percent. These coefficients gather the effect of an extra year of voca-
tional (academic) education on wage, filtering out the effect of compulsory schooling. By
performing an F -test, we reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients (p = 0.00), i.e.,
at the mean, the effect of one additional year of academic education on wage is larger
than the effect on one additional year of vocational education. The question is whether
modeling on average loses some important features of this comparison. Therefore, we
bring the discussion into a distributional framework.
Columns 2-6 of Table 6 present the QR estimates for model (7) at various quantiles of
the wage distribution. The first result is that, as in Table 3, returns to both vocational and
academic education are increasing in the quantiles of the wage distribution. However, the
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increasing pattern and the magnitude of the estimated effects are significantly different.
At the lower quantiles of the wage distribution, vocational education has a statistically
significant return premium in comparison to academic education. From the fourth decile
on, the situation is reversed: Academic education has higher returns for one additional
year of schooling. Thus, in the upper part of the wage distribution, academic education
brings a significant premium compared to vocational education.
In particular, at the bottom decile, the return to one extra year of vocational ed-
ucation is 5.0 percent, whereas the return to one additional year of academic education
is only 4.1 percent. We reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients at each level of
significance (p = 0.00). At the third decile the situation is different, with an estimated
return of about 6.4 percent for both academic and vocational tracks (p = 0.66). At
the median, the returns to vocational and academic educations are 6.9 percent and 7.3
percent, respectively. Similarly to OLS, at the median we reject the null hypothesis of
equal coefficients, with a p-value of 0.00. At the top decile, academic education brings a
return of 9.6 percent, while vocational education has an estimated return of 8.3 percent.
The difference between the estimated coefficients is statistically significant (p = 0.00).
Figure 3 provides graphical support complementing the Table 6 results that we just dis-
cussed, comparing OLS estimates with QR estimates across the entire wage distribution,
estimated for all quantiles from τ = 0.1 to τ = 0.9.
For a better understanding of the academic premium, we rewrite model (7) as a func-
tion of the difference between the two educational tracks, with vocational education as
the reference category. While doing so prevents us from seeing the pattern of vocational
and academic educations separately, the transformation allows estimating confidence in-
tervals for the academic premium. Figure 4 plots the academic premium over the wage
distribution, along with its 95 percent confidence intervals.
One potential explanation for these results is the skill formation of vocational and
academic educations. Indeed, while the vocational education system provides a set of
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Table 6: Returns to Vocational and Academic Education, OLS and QR
Variables OLS 1st Decile 3rd Decile Median 7th Decile 9th Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Compulsory education -0.032** -0.062** -0.038** -0.028** -0.018** -0.015*
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Vocational education 0.068** 0.050** 0.064** 0.069** 0.075** 0.083**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Academic education 0.071** 0.041** 0.064** 0.073** 0.082** 0.096**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.045** 0.029** 0.035** 0.041** 0.046** 0.058**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age2/100 -0.043** -0.031** -0.035** -0.039** -0.043** -0.053**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 10.133** 10.474** 10.259** 10.145** 10.043** 9.921**
(0.045) (0.081) (0.042) (0.039) (0.046) (0.081)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
(Pseudo) R2 0.309 0.072 0.163 0.220 0.250 0.243
F -statistic βˆV = βˆA 11.71** 23.63** 0.190 22.94** 51.06** 62.09**
N 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable
is the natural logarithm of annual wage.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
Figure 3: Returns to Vocational and Academic Education, QR Estimates
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Figure 4: Academic Education Premium, QR Estimates
skills that are specific to the job that the apprentices are learning (Busemeyer and Tram-
pusch, 2012), in academic education the exploitation of the acquired skills strongly de-
pends on whether or not the workers are using them in the labor market (Dearden,
McIntosh, Myck, and Vignoles, 2002). In addition, vocational education is likely a bet-
ter fit for students at the lower part of the wage distribution, because those students
learn contents that better match and complement their innate abilities (Rosenbaum and
Rosenbaum, 2013). As a consequence, at the lower quantiles of the wage distribution,
vocational education brings a return premium because individuals with an academic ed-
ucation in this part of the distribution have a relative disadvantage in the job they are
performing. Conversely, at some point in the wage distribution (in our case τ = 0.4) aca-
demic education, as opposed to vocational education, starts generating a return premium
because workers have the capacity of fully exploiting their skills in the labor market.
Given that we are more interested in the presence of heterogeneity and because we did
not find appropriate instrumental variables for both academic and vocational education,
we do not claim that the estimated effects in the between-within path comparison are
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causal. We nevertheless performed some simple two-stage quantile regressions13 that
show lower returns to academic education at the bottom of the wage distribution and
a return premium of the academic path in the upper part of the wage distribution. As
an instrument for academic education we use a dummy that equals one if the canton
of residence has a university. Dee (2004) and Card (1993) use a similar approach. For
academic education we exploit regional variation in preference for vocational education
compared to academic education, as in Rupietta and Backes-Gellner (2012).
6 Conclusions
This study presents evidence of heterogeneous returns to education over the wage distri-
bution. We use instrumental variable quantile regression and data from the Swiss Labor
Force Survey to isolate the causal link between education and wage at different quantiles
of the conditional distribution of wages. Our results provide significant evidence that no
unique causal effect of schooling exists and that for each individual the effect may be
above or below the estimates extensively documented using OLS or TSLS, depending on
his position in the wage distribution and his unobservable wage determinants.
In particular, while ordinary QR results indicate that returns to education are in-
creasing in the quantile index, once we take the endogeneity of schooling into account, we
instead observe higher returns at lower quantiles of the wage distribution. Interpreting
the quantile index as a measure of unobserved ability, our findings suggest that less able
individuals profit more form one additional year of education. While higher-ability indi-
viduals have on average higher wages, the slope of their wage-education profile is flatter
than that for lower-ability individuals. This finding indicates, as discussed by Ashenfelter
and Rouse (1998), that more able individuals acquire more schooling because they face
13Results are available upon request. We do not report them because the instruments we use are only
arguably exogenous. We used the two-stage QR approach of Chen and Portnoy (1996), based on Powell
(1983) early work.
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lower marginal costs, not because they receive higher marginal benefits.
From a methodological point of view, one noteworthy result of our analysis is that
a reduced-form quantile IV approach, akin to TSLS, produces qualitatively similar esti-
mates to the structural IVQR approach, which is based on stronger assumptions. The
comparability of these estimates indicates that our core results are not sensitive to the
estimation procedure.
We also investigate the potential heterogeneity in the returns within and between
different educational paths. Exploiting the unique feature of the Swiss educational system
that allows students achieve tertiary education degrees for both academic and vocational
tracks, we complement the existing literature by confirming that, at the mean, academic
education brings higher returns. However, if we examine the returns over the wage
distribution, we observe two relevant—and until now unknown—features of the returns
to vocational and academic education.
First, we reveal significant heterogeneity within each educational path, with both
vocational and academic educations presenting increasing returns over the wage distribu-
tion. Second, a comparison between the two tracks shows that academic education does
not always yield higher returns. In the upper part of the wage distribution, individuals
with an academic background have higher returns than individuals with a vocational
background. However, at lower quantiles of the wage distribution, vocational education
brings higher returns than academic education. These results imply that answering the
question of whether academic education yields higher labor market returns than voca-
tional education is not as easy as it might have once appeared from descriptive statistics
or mean regression. Indeed, the answer depends on the individual’s position in the con-
ditional wage distribution.
Our work can be extended in a number of ways. First, analyzing the evolution
over time of the quantile returns to education, and what impact the returns have on
the structure of wages, would be valuable. According to our results, education should
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have an inequality-reducing effect over time, because individuals with lower ability (i.e.,
those at the lower quantiles of the wage distribution) appear to profit more from formal
education. However, such inquiry is complicated by the likelihood that the endogeneity
and measurement error biases change over time.
Second, in line with several cross-country studies conducted for example by Martins
and Pereira (2004) and by Trostel, Walker, and Woolley (2002), researchers and policy-
makers might use an international comparison to study how the causal returns to educa-
tion change with different wage distributions and education systems. Third, researchers
could explore the potential non-linear relationship between education and wages by al-
lowing the returns to differ not only between educational paths but also across education
levels, as, for example, in Buchinsky (1994); Hartog, Pereira, and Vieira (2001).
A fourth, and compelling, extension to our work would be evaluating the impact
of changes in the distribution of education on quantiles of the unconditional (marginal)
distribution of wages. Doing so would help estimate the effect of one additional year
of schooling on the entire wage distribution, not only at a given quantile. However, to
shed light on this topic, we would need an adaptation of the unconditional QR approach
(Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 2009) to instrumental variables estimation—an adaptation
not yet available.
This study shows that typical estimates of the mean return to education provide a rel-
atively incomplete characterization of the impact of education on labor market outcomes
and thus constitute a weak guide for public policy. Similarly, distributional analyses
using ordinary QR also constitute an inappropriate tool for describing the true impact
of education on wages, because they do not control for unobserved heterogeneity. Our
results suggest that the net impact of education on the long-run distribution of income
does not necessarily depend on the initial distribution of ability across the population,
and we empirically support the argument that formal education partially compensates
for differences in innate abilities and early life conditions.
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APPENDIX
A The Swiss Education System
Figure A.1: The Swiss Education System
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B Analytic Sample
Table B.1: Sample Construction
Initial sample (SLFS 2000–2009) 160,925
Males 74,871
Fully employed 47,347
Age between 18 and 60 44,670
Not in education or gap year 42,612
Wage not missing 35,095
99 percent of wage distribution 34,744
Analytic sample 34,744
Notes: Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
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C Summary of the Reform of 1970
Table C.1: Compulsory Education Expansion
Canton Entry Age Reform Year Before After First Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Zu¨rich 6 Yes 1977 8 9 1971
Bern 6 No 9 9
Luzern 6 Yes 1985 8 9 1979
Uri 7 Yes 1977 7 9 1970
Schwyz 7 Yes 1992 7 9 1985
Obwalden 7 Yes 1992 7 9 1985
Nidwalden 6 Yes 1992 7 9 1986
Glarus 6 Yes 1983 8 9 1977
Zug 7 Yes 1990 8 9 1983
Fribourg 7 No 9 9
Solothurn 7 Yes 1970 8 9 1963
Basel-Stadt 6 No 9 9
Basel-Land 6 Yes 1980 8 9 1974
Schaffausen 6 Yes 1982 8 9 1976
Appenzell A. 6 Yes 1981 8 9 1975
Appenzell I. 6 Yes 1984 7 9 1978
St. Gallen 6 Yes 1983 8 9 1977
Graubu¨nden 7 No 9 9
Aargau 7 Yes 1982 8 9 1975
Thurgau 6 Yes 1980 8 9 1974
Ticino 6 No 9 9
Vaud 7 No 9 9
Valais 7 Yes 1987 8 9 1980
Neuchaˆtel 6 No 9 9
Gene`ve 6 No 9 9
Jura 6 No 9 9
Notes: Authors’ research and calculations.
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Table C.2: Change in School-Year Start
Canton Entry Age Reform Year Before After First Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Zu¨rich 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1974
Bern 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1974
Luzern 6 No Fall Fall
Uri 7 No Fall Fall
Schwyz 7 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1975
Obwalden 7 No Fall Fall
Nidwalden 6 No Fall Fall
Glarus 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1975
Zug 7 Yes 1973 Spring Fall 1958
Fribourg 7 No Fall Fall
Solothurn 7 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1973
Basel-Stadt 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1974
Basel-Land 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1975
Schaffausen 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1975
Appenzell A. 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1975
Appenzell I. 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1976
St. Gallen 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1975
Graubu¨nden 7 No Fall Fall
Aargau 7 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1974
Thurgau 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1974
Ticino 6 No Fall Fall
Vaud 7 Yes 1973 Spring Fall 1957
Valais 7 No Fall Fall
Neuchaˆtel 6 Yes 1973 Spring Fall 1958
Gene`ve 6 No Fall Fall
Jura 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1974
Notes: Authors’ research and calculations.
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D Alternative IV and Over-identified Models
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